Saturday, July 25, 2026

On Mythicism-Re Free Inquiry Article

 by Don Wharton

I had an article on Jesus mythicism printed in the February/March 2026 issue of Free Inquiry. This is the secular humanist magazine published by CFI, the Center for Inquiry. The article includes my assertion that: “The vast majority of the Jesus narrative is within a mythic framework that cannot be real and there are no theoretical chains of causation by which a modestly rigorous historicism can be demonstrated with existing evidence.”

This article was precipitated by a prior article submitted debunking absurd claims made by Bill Cooke in an article titled, Five Challenges to Christ Myth Theorists. That submission is posted here on Secular Perspectives. Please see that post for further on those prior claims.

For me it does not matter if a there was a man named some cognate of “Jesus” that assisted in any way in the founding of Christianity. If we can know nothing about any such person, it is a moot question if he existed or stories about him were made up later. There would be no way to determine which was the case. I am just using epistemology, the science of knowing what we know, to reframe the debate.

I regarded the existing evidence for mythicism to be overwhelming and definitive. The continuing support for the historicism thesis was supported only because of the continuing assertion that Jesus was still possible as a historical figure. This “logical possibility” is then translated by those who want to support historicism as a “consensus” that he somehow is a historical figure despite the evidence that this was highly unlikely. This “possibility” mongering needs to be precluded by a proper framing of the issue. Thus I titled my article A CERN level Proof of Mythicism. CERN regarded evidence that is five standard deviation from chance equivalent to scientific certainty. That translates into 34,000 to 1 odds. That requires a clear logical definition for the criterion of proof and a review of all first century extra-Biblical evidence and a thorough review of New Testament evidence.

All people have a finite number of hours in their lives. We have the right to allocate our hours where we wish. Christianity is claiming to provided reliable historical facts about the ministry of Jesus. There are none, let alone a collection of reliable historical truths from which any interesting narrative can be constructed and shared as reliable history. My article elaborated a bit further on what in my opinion would be adequate to warrant the attention of a secular person: “A historical Jesus about whom we know this one fact at a 50%, coin flip level of certainty, is for me just not worthy of my attention. It is entirely reasonable for a secular supporter of scientific materialism to want modestly more evidence than one possible fact to maybe be true for a person to be accepted as historical.” For this reason I included a criterion in my modestly rigorous historicism to be “Two or more events in this life can be confirmed at a 70% probability or higher.” Frankly, a 70% probability is much less than anything that can be regarded as reliable. It is just modestly greater than a coin flip. Two possible events in our hypothetical historical person would still be radically less than enough to create a narrative that is worthy of our interest. We would just have a minimal level sufficient to suggest that there MAY be enough real history to attract the attention of someone who was avoiding pure mythology.

A poll funded by Episcopalians found that only 38% of non-Christians believed in a historical Jesus. 57% of the religious non-Christians, a majority, likewise rejected a historical Jesus. On average those who identify as atheists, free thinkers, or secular humanists would be more likely to know of the extensive documentation of the reasons to doubt that Jesus was a historical figure. We can expect a substantially lower fraction of us would believe in historicity. We simply do not care that the academic theologians and historians assert a “consensus” that Jesus was historical. They have published nothing in their peer-reviewed literature that could convince an informed non-Christian jury of this presumed historicism. The so called consensus does not have majority support outside of an academic echo chamber that is largely paid to train new ministers. Their dogma is required to work in this field.

Regrettably, Ron Lindsay paid no attention whatsoever to my reframing of the issue. He asserts in his condemnation of my article, “Wharton states that those claiming Jesus was real need to show there are two facts about Jesus that can be confirmed ‘at a 70 percent probability or higher’? Why? Whence this 70 percent figure? Wharton does not explain; it just appears to be his ipse dixit. Moreover, why should the burden of proof be on the person who is asserting what is the most widely held belief by both scholars and laypersons? That’s peculiar.”

He is claiming that I did not explain my reasoning for my claim when my article explicitly does just that. My fourth paragraph above elaborates those reasons more fully for those who did not comprehend what I had in the article. My article continues to conclusively demonstrate that there is no Biblical or first century extra-Biblical evidence that could contravene my CERN level proof. Once that is done, yes the burden rests with the historicists to demonstrate how and where I might be wrong. It is not “peculiar” at all.

To be fair to Lindsay, he does attempt to present some evidence for a reader to question a few of my claims. He asserts, “Josephus discusses how the high priest Ananus was removed from office for improperly ordering the execution of various individuals, including, ‘the brother of Jesus, called Christ, whose name was James’ (Antiquities XX, 197-203).” I reference a peer-reviewed article debunking this in my footnote 11. He goes on to claim, “there is also a reference to James, the brother of Jesus, in the New Testament (Galatians 1:18-19).” Lindsay include is scorn for me declaring that all I do is “deny, deny, deny.” No, I note that there are two peer-reviewed articles showing that this passage does not mean a biological brother. It is a fictive brother in the brotherhood of Christ. Noting peer-reviewed articles is not a simple denying. It is giving substantive reason to respect careful research that has undergone peer review in the literature.

Lindsay, cites nine non-Gospel New Testament passages to legitimately suggest that, “For a supposedly entirely spiritual being, Jesus was pretty fleshy.” This ignores the fact that it is normal for modern churches to say that we will have bodies in heaven. They cite Biblical passages and there are other extra-Biblical stories such as, The Ascension of Isaiah, that include very fleshy stories in heaven. Ascension had Jesus being born of a woman in the seventh heaven and killed by crucifixion on a tree in the first heaven. There is no way to determine that the authors intended the reader to presume an earthly existence and even if they did there is no way to verify that it was anything other than a made up tale.

Lindsay cites “The Epistle of Ignatius to the Trallians, written in the early second century CE—possibly as early as 107 CE”, to suggest that it “confirms Christians regarded Jesus as a real, fleshy human who was crucified under Pilate.” Nothing composed in the second century can confirm the reality on the ground in early first century. The first half of the second century is extremely sparse with anything from Christian leaders suggesting knowledge of or belief in the Gospels. This suggests that the four Gospel books of the New Testament were still evolving and were acknowledge by few.

Much of Lindsay’s article attempts to deal with the fact that Paul does not deal with a historical Jesus and explicitly says of his teachings, “For I neither received it of man, neither was I taught [it,] but by the revelation of Jesus Christ. Galatians 1:12.” This ignores the many authors of other books of the New Testament, none of whom cite anything from the four books of the canonical Gospels.

The last issue addressed by Lindsay was my analysis of Richard Carrier’s Rank/Raglan 22 point model of early hero figures who were mostly mythical. Unfortunately, after I wrote my article I became aware of three additional figures that Carrier agreed were likely historical figures. This happened rather recently. Lindsay asserted that my case for mythicism “collapses” with the case of Alexander the Great. Unfortunately, Lindsay was unaware that Carrier allowed for up to four additional historical figured to be added to this class of heroes in his prior analysis. He had suggested that this Rank/Raglan analysis suggested there was only one chance in three that Jesus was historical. He decided that with years of critical analysis the odds from this analysis should be be reduced to only one chance in four that Jesus is historical.

My article contained many other reasons to doubt that the four gospel narratives contained anything that was reliable.




















Bill Cooke’s Misleading, Meritless Review | Free Inquiry



Sunday, July 12, 2026

Where Chalmers is mistaken regarding “the Hard Problem” of consciousness

 By Mathew Goldstein


Philosopher Massimo Pigluicci recently commented on two mistakes found in Philosopher David Chalmers arguments for consciousness being a uniquely hard problem that is resistant to scientific explanation. The article, The Hard Problem is a category mistakeis partially restricted to subscribers. Chalmers claims unconscious human zombies must be possible merely because they are conceivable and he also claims that attempts to explain how consciousness manifests itself will be incomplete as long as such explanations fail to also explain how consciousness is experienced. 


Pigluicci points out that it is conceivable that a circle can be converted into a square encompassing the same area as the circle. However, the number corresponding to the area of a circle always includes a transcendent value, pi, while the number representing the area of square contains no transcendent number. So what is conceivable is not therefore what is also possible. Now it needs to be said here that the recent progress in computer artificial intelligence arguably provides more credence to philosophical zombies being a possibility.


Furthermore, it is generally true that “a description of anything is not the same thing as the thing described…. This is not a special problem about consciousness, it is just what descriptions are. They are not the things they describe. The map, if you will, is not the territory, and to confuse the two is a serious error. To treat such a “gap” as evidence that the description is incomplete is to commit what [philosopher Gilbert] Ryle called a category mistake: demanding that an explanation do something that explanations are not in the business of doing.”


The phenomena of consciousness is more intertwined with the first person experience perspective than most other phenomena. This is a genuine complication. Yet consciousness also has observable implications and correlates. We need not be thwarted by philosophical zombies, or questions regarding what it is like to be a bat, when logically associating those observations with consciousness. This is because we know we share the same biology as a result of biological evolution so we can build our understanding of consciousness on that solid foundation.


Notice that this still leaves open the question of whether an intelligence that is not biological can be conscious. Richard Dawkins has been ridiculed for taking this possibility seriously. See A conversation between Dawkins and ChatGPT. His perspective is that the evolution that gave us conscious self-awareness works at the level of the gene. Consciousness is a product of information processing if we understand that the brain, together with the body, is an information collecting and processing machine. This perspective has merit regardless of how uncomfortable it may be for us. An understanding that AI relies on sophisticated pattern matching gives us reason to dismiss the conclusion that it is conscious regardless of any appearance to the contrary. Yet we cannot rule out that future technological advances could enable future AI to acquire consciousness. It could be difficult for remote AI users to recognize the difference between AI that is unconscious and AI that is conscious.

Sunday, July 05, 2026

Biological sex discrimination in sports competition contexts

 By Mathew Goldstein


In the recent case WEST VIRGINIA ET AL. v. B. P. J., BY HER NEXT FRIEND AND MOTHER, HEATHER JACKSON I have read the dissents written by Justices Sotomayor and Jackson, and also supported by Kagan. I agreed with their dissents, see https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/25pdf/24-43_2b35.pdf. They agreed that the majority is correct to conclude that the Javits Amendment and resulting regulations permit biological sex discrimination of this sort in a sports competition context under TITLE IX. However, they argue that the majority was wrong to assert that the term “sex” in Title IX “cannot plausibly be interpreted to refer to anything other than biological sex.” The minority opinion also complained that there are relevant unresolved factual issues that should be considered before reaching a decision in this particular case. That approach introduces a substantial decision making complexity. It could be difficult to draw such lines given all of the technical uncertainties and ambiguities inherent in evaluating how the various medical interventions interact with the various biological mechanisms that potentially changes the various relevant sports competition outcomes for various different sports. Most people with disorders of sexual development are either biological males or females, and some are not, which are additional complications.


The majority decision bypasses the complexities by placing no restrictions on the states with no commitment to revisit this issue. For them, transgender youth lack a compelling federal equal protection claim that SCOTUS needs to act on. In contrast, the dissenters want to consider defining federal restrictions on state laws that otherwise would disadvantage transgender youth. Yet they indicated they are unprepared to proceed with that at this time because they lack the factual foundation for deciding precisely what limits on state authority will strike the needed balance between the potentially conflicting equal protection rights of the biological females and transgender girls. The dissenters say that attempting to decide this case at this time is premature because the relevant factual issues have not yet been litigated. The biological male who was prevented by state law from participating on the public school woman’s sport team, and on whose behalf this lawsuit was filed, takes male puberty blockers. It is not entirely clear to what extent the participation of a biological male in female sports who never underwent male puberty would be unfair to biological females.


The controversy is not confined to how to manage biological males participating in female sports competitions, it also encompasses the question of whether puberty blockers (and other such medical interventions) should be used on minors to treat gender dysphoria. The currently available evidence relevant to evaluating whether the benefits of such treatments for minors outweighs the costs (including the potential costs of long term use of puberty blockers to prevent puberty) is incomplete. It is generally not the role of the judiciary to evaluate the appropriateness of medical practices when deciding how to resolve civil rights claims and the dissenting Justices did not raise this issue. Yet ongoing uncertainties surrounding what qualifies as best practice for managing youth gender dysphoria is also a reason for the Justices to be cautious when being asked to make rulings based on current medical practice.


This decision arguably went further than necessary by restricting the applicability of the anti-discrimination provisions of Title IX to biological sex. There already is a legal exemption from Title IX for sports competitions. Nevertheless the majority decided to leverage this case to establish that additional, and broader, limitation on the scope of Title IX. Critics of this decision are correct to be concerned that there is a tendency of various recent Supreme Court decisions to erode civil rights protections for some minorities. Various secularists groups, specifically AA, FFRF, and AHA, expressed opinions against this decision that could be described as strident.


When adults medically transition themselves away from their biological sex (biological sex is both permanent and binary) they thereby do no harm to anyone else. They thereby newly re-present themselves as a woman, or as a man, and for most contexts that is what they are. Yet there are a few contexts where biological sex still retains some significance. There is a tendency when confronted with this complexity to oversimplify. Some people very skeptically declare that there is no such thing as gender dysphoria, other people very non-skeptically declare minors in distress who claim to be transgender should be promptly placed on puberty blockers and be encouraged to publicly transition themselves with few exceptions. There appears to be good reason to doubt that implementing either of those simple approaches produces the best overall results.